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This paper presents the findings of research into the distribution of the rewards from capital 
used in defence production. Much existing research has examined the supply chain in the 
production of defence goods, but there have been few attempts to look at the ownership of 
suppliers. First, the paper examines two theoretical issues: why the identity of shareholders in 
defence contractors should have any economic or political significance, and whether the use 
of capital in defence industries should in principle be expected to be the same as that in any 
other industry. It then investigates the identity and ownership of the contractors concerned in 
2003-4, using several case studies.  It finds that many of the largest suppliers to the UK 
government are foreign-owned or controlled, and it finds evidence of a surprising degree of 
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        There are several reasons why the ownership of defence contracting companies is of 
significance.  Firstly, many governments, including those of the United Kingdom and the 
United States, have extended considerably their use of public/private partnerships, private 
financing arrangements, outsourcing, and other arrangements that amount to various forms of 
privatization.  For the sake, at the very least, of transparency in the dealings of the state with 
private business it ought to be known who are the ultimate financial beneficiaries, and by how 
much they benefit.  Secondly, there may be reasons of security for wanting to know the 
identity of owners – would the British government, for example, be content for Chinese or 
North Korean interests to control a major defence supplier, and will the owners, whoever they 
are, be reliable sources of finance?  Thirdly, there may be reasons of economic governance: 
are the owners in a position to collude in monopolistic or anti-competitive practices; do they 
behave towards other stakeholders in an acceptable fashion?  
                  The issue of defence company ownership issue takes on a greater urgency with the 
recognition of the revolution currently sweeping through the global defence industry, changing 
fundamentally its character, location, focus and modus operandi (Matthews and Tredinnick, 
2001).  Following the end of the Cold War in 1989-1990, the industry and the defence sector 
more generally underwent considerable restructuring and more recent developments have led to 
it undergoing further rapid transformation (Dunne et al, 2003; Braddon, 2000). The shift in 
military doctrine and strategy from the demands of the ‘mutually assured destruction’ 
doctrine of the Cold War years to the evolving ‘rapid reaction’ approach with its associated 
humanitarian requirements, network-centric warfare developments and ‘homeland security’ 
issues linked to the terrorist threat have brought and will continue to bring new players and 
new owners into the defence supply business of the future. Every aspect of the defence sector 
is being reconfigured from defence budgets, through procurement policies and military 
objectives and strategy to leading-edge technological developments designed to meet the 
requirements of the move towards ‘network centric’ warfare (see, for example, Braddon 2004, 
Hartley, 2003a, 2003b).  These changes are certain to result in a further fundamental 
restructuring of the UK defence industrial base (Hayward, 2005).   Major ownership changes 
have already occurred (Guay and Callum, 2002; Hartley and Sandler, 2003) and, as the 
revolution spreads further through the supply base of the industry (Dowdall, 2004), further 
ownership adjustments seem inevitable 
 
2. PROVISION OF CAPITAL TO THE DEFENCE INDUSTRY 
         There are two main respects in which the provision of capital to a defence contractor 
might have special characteristics.  The first would affect any contractor to the public sector:  
government generally represents a more favourable credit risk than other customers.  Since 
government is less likely than private businesses to renege on its financial obligations, a 
private company doing business with it faces a lower risk, and therefore, ceteris paribus, a 
more attractive risk-adjusted return.  This would be as true of a defence contractor as of any 
other kind.  The second is more particularly true of defence, although it could in principle 
apply also to other fields.  Governments need security of supply, sometimes over a long 
period of time, and they are likely to favour suppliers who can guarantee this.   
         Once the contract is granted, however, the contractor may have more negotiating power 
than it would otherwise have because the government is vulnerable to interruption of supply. 
These two considerations suggest that defence contractors are in a relatively privileged 
position as business enterprises and helps to explain the long-standing popularity of defence 
contracts in the business world. This is likely to be reflected in the rates of return available to 
such businesses, which theory would be adjusted by the markets to reflect a lower risk profile. 
         The categories of financial capital needed in a defence contracting should be exactly the 
same as those in any other commercial enterprise.  These would naturally include equity share 
capital, securitised borrowings such as bonds and convertible stocks, some of which may have 
the status of quasi-equity, and borrowings from financial institutions such as banks.  These all 
represent the liabilities on the balance sheet, and the providers of them are the beneficiaries of 
returns to capital.  There may, of course, be circumstances in which the holders of debt can  
acquire ownership-like rights, for instance on bankruptcy or liquidation.  Normally, however, 
the ownership rights giving the potential for control over the company will arise from the 
share capital.  Unless the company is in severe financial difficulties or is seeking to raise large 
amounts of new capital it will be the equity holders, amongst the providers of finance, who 
will have most power to decide the destiny of the company. Returns to holders of capital 
come in various forms.  These are mainly through dividends and through legal participation in 
the value of any potential liquidation interest for shareholders, and through interest for debt 
holders.   
         Information about shareholding in major corporations is generally more accessible than 
information about the providers of loan finance.  Most major defence contractors are 
companies having a formal listing on one or more stock exchanges and either they, or some 
other public authority, often require the disclosure of major equity holdings.  This may be 
done through the annual report and accounts of the company or may result from an 
announcement to a stock exchange.  In some jurisdictions it is possible for members of the 
public to access a copy of the shareholders’ register on payment of a fee.  Securitised debt 
may be held in registered form, but the register may not be available to the public and owners 
are less easy to identify than shareholders.  Bearer bonds are not registered and it is virtually 
impossible to determine ownership.  Bank lending is generally confidential, although large 
syndicated loans will be in the public arena, and not easy to research.   
          Most shareholders have the same legal status as one another, but they are likely to 
differ in many other ways that are of potential interest in this study.  The main ways in which 
they may differ are: size of shareholding (measured as a proportion of total share capital, or of 
total “free” share capital), time period over which the shares are held, degree of activity or 
passivity in relation to corporate votes and actions, and their own legal or financial status.  
With successive shareholder registers at regular time intervals and information about the 
owners it should be possible in principle to analyse the ownership structure and character of 
any given company in accordance with the variables listed 
           The shareholdings that would probably be of most interest in respect of defence-related 
companies would be those held by governments or other public agencies, large (over perhaps 
10%) strategic stakes held by any non-government legal entity, but especially by commercial 
or industrial groups with multi-national or other defence interests, and foreign shareholders.  
Other categories could also be of interest in different contexts.  Any researcher would be 
seeking to spot potential covert or overt connections, networks, cartels, or agreements. 
 
BRITAIN’S DEFENCE CONTRACTORS 
         In the Defence Analytical Services Agency statistics for 2002-2003 (DASA, 2003) 28 
organisations are listed in the first three ranks of defence contractors to the UK Ministry of 
Defence.  These categories are first, those receiving contacts of over £500m, second those 
between £250-500m, and third those between £100-250m of (see Table 1 above).  In 
aggregate these companies account for at least £5.5bn of the UK defence procurement budget 













Table 1: 28 Biggest MoD Contractors 2002/03 
Over £500 million 
 
•  BAe Systems (Operations) Ltd 
•  BAe Systems Electronics Ltd (both part of BAe Systems PLC, the listed company) 
•  NETMA (Nato Eurofighter and Tornado Management Agency, multi-national 
public sector, including MOD) 
•  QinetiQ Ltd (public/private, some US) 
 
£250m - £500m 
 
•  AWE Management Ltd (3 - way BNFL, Lockheed Martin, Serco) 
•  Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (MOD) 
•  Devonport Royal Dockyard Ltd (actually run for profit by DML - see separate 
slide) 
•  General Dynamics United (USA listed company) 
•  MBDA UK Ltd (EADS 37.5%, BAe 37.5%, Finmeccanica 25%) 
•  Rolls Royce PLC (London-listed but at least 50% foreign owned) 
•  Westland Group PLC (now owned by Finmeccanica of Italy) 
 
£100m - 250m 
 
•  ABRO (MOD-controlled vehicle maintenance and engineering trading agency) 
•  Alenia Marconi (BAe/Finmeccanica jointly owned) 
•  Annington Receivables Ltd (owned by a company ultimately 51% controlled by 
Nomura of Japan) 
•  Babcock Support Services Ltd (part of UK-listed Babcock PLC) 
•  BAe Systems PLC (the listed holding company) 
•  BFS Group Ltd (UK company, owners obscure) 
•  British Telecommunications PLC (t th he e BT) 
•  DARA (Defence Aviation Repair Agency, controlled by MOD) 
•  EDS Defence Ltd (subsidiary of USA EDS computer services giant) 
•  Fleet Support Ltd (50/50 BAe and Vosper Thorneycroft, both UK listed) 
•  Fujitsu Services Ltd (owned by Japanese Fujitsu Group, itself mainly Japanese 
owned) 
•  IBM United Kingdom Holdings Ltd (USA control)Interserve (Defence) Ltd (part of 
UK listed group) 
•  Lockheed Martin Corp (guess!) 
•  Other UK Government Departments (sic in MOD document) 
•  Royal Ordnance PLC (part of BAe group) 




         We will first explore the ownership issue for UK defence companies by examining a 
number of these major UK suppliers and identifying what other defence interests, national or 
international, they influence through ownership linkages. 
  
         The UK’s largest defence supplier is BAE Systems, a major prime contractor, a systems 
integrator and by far the dominant player in the UK defence market. BAE Systems’ 
ownership linkages are both extensive and global in nature.  The company owns a range of 
other UK defence suppliers, including all of Royal Ordnance Defence and Alvis; 37.5% of 
MBDA, the guided weapons supplier; as well as 35% of the Swedish defence contractor, Saab 
AB; 50% of European Aerosystems, the Anglo-French  future aircraft technology research 
group; 20% of Aeronautical Technologies Company (an Anglo- South African venture); 50% 
of Italy’s defence electronics supplier Alenia Marconi Systems and  25% of  New Astrium, 
the Anglo-French-German satellite company. The significance of its growing global 
acquisition strategy is explored further below. 
          The UK’s military aero-engine manufacturer, Rolls-Royce plc, owns 100% of the US 
aero-engine company, Allison and of the German aero-engine organisation, Rolls-Royce 
GmbH. It also owns 50% of the Anglo-French aero-engine company Rolls-Royce Turbomeca 
and 33% of the Anglo-German aero-engine company MTU Turbomeca Rolls-Royce (MTR) 
GmbH. The company also owns all of Reumech, the South African light armoured vehicle 
manufacturer and is involved in at least two other global co-ownership arrangements with a 
50% ownership of the aero-engine maintenance company Rolls-Royce Services Limitada Inc 
in the Phillipines and 46.8% of IPT SA in Spain. 
          QinetiQ, established in July 2001, is the world’s first leading-edge national defence 
laboratory to be in the process of transition to the private sector.  It derives principally from 
the former UK Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA) which originally led ‘blue 
skies’ testing, research and development for the UK Ministry of Defence and was responsible 
for a series of major technical developments such as the invention of liquid crystal displays, 
flat panel speakers, Chobham armour and microwave radar.  Interestingly, while still 
officially UK government controlled (a 57% government shareholding) and formally a public-
private partnership moving towards stock market quotation, QinetiQ already owns the US 
computer software and support company, Westar Aerospace and Defence Group as well as 
the US engineering and technology development company, Foster-Miller Inc. Such foreign 
ownership is likely to increase considerably once the company is fully privatised. 
          The Smiths Group has a significant range of aerospace, threat detection, security and 
engineering activities related to defence across its 4 divisions. A key player in the UK defence 
supply market, on the threat detection and security side Smiths also owns ETI Technology 
Inc., a US-based, privately owned company that specialises in the detection of harmful 
biological agents and Farran Technology Limited, based in the Republic of Ireland as well as 
SensIR Technologies LLC, a leading US manufacturer of infrared-based analysers and TRAK 
Communications Inc., a leader in the design and manufacture of microwave sub-systems, 
antennas and related components,.  On the speciality engineering side of its business, Smiths 
owns the Chinese-based Tianjin Timing Seals Co Ltd and its associated technology.  The 
aerospace business  of Smiths has also been expanded by the acquisition of Integrated 
Aerospace Inc., a privately owned, California-based supplier of specialist landing gear 
systems and of the specialist aero-engine component manufacturer, Dynamic Gunver 
Technologies (DGT) of the US. Cobham plc is another important UK defence supply 
company that operates in three sectors - aerospace systems, avionics and flight operations & 
services. Originally founded in 1934 as a British company, through organic growth and 
acquisitions, the company has become a globally focused group producing a world-class 
range of niche products and systems for military and civil aviation, marine, homeland security 
and other related markets. The group owns some 70 companies located across the world. For 
example, Cobham owns ACR Electronics Inc in the US; Air Precision SA in France; Chelton 
Applied Composites in Sweden; Drager Aerospace in Germany;  Falcon Special Air Services 
in Malaysia; Mastsystem Int’l Oy in Finland; National Jet Systems Pty Ltd in Australia;   
Orion in Canada; and also Spectronic Denmark A/S in Denmark. 
           Similar acquisition strategies by the key players in defence markets outside the UK 
also impact on the ownership issue. For example, the acquisition of the UK company Racal 
by Thomson-CSF in 2000 made the French company the second largest defence company  
operating in the UK and enabled it to use the British operation to access the US market more 
easily.  
         Again, the changing ownership process in the defence sector is frequently more far-
reaching than it seems on the surface and can exert a significant influence on procurement 
success in different markets. A good example of this was the takeover of Marconi Electronic 
Systems by BAE in January 1999. While dealing a severe blow to hopes of European defence 
industry consolidation designed to match the market power of the US, the move by BAE 
Systems also gave them control of an American electronics company, Tracor, which GEC 
Marconi had themselves acquired in 1997.  With 10,000 US employees, Tracor became the 
largest US defence enterprise owned by a European-based company.  Both GEC and BAE 
had to employ a ‘proxy’ board to run the Tracor company, comprised of US citizens only but 
felt that this ‘inconvenience’ was more than compensated for by the access ownership 
afforded to the lucrative and expanding US market. 
          Additional  ownership  changes  helped  to  further  strengthen  the  position  of  BAE 
Systems in the US market. In April 2000, BAE gained ownership of Lockheed Martin Control 
Systems (a flight controls designer and manufacturer) and in July 2000, became owner of 
Lockheed Martin’s Aerospace Electronics business division. Such acquisitions have given 
BAE Systems an employment ‘footprint’ in the US of some 25,000, helped secure important 
contracts with US prime contractors and led to the official recognition in 2003 of BAE 
Systems as an ‘American’ company by the Pentagon in the context of its defence procurement 
strategy. 
                  While accessing the US defence and aerospace market remains a key reason for 
ownership changes in the industry, the ownership route may not always deliver a beneficial 
outcome as initially intended. For example, the merger of the German car company Daimler-
Benz (the parent company of the German defence/aerospace company Dasa) with the US car 
company Chrysler in 1998 opened up new market opportunities in the US for Dasa. Initially, 
considerable success was enjoyed with Dasa selling a significant order of Mercedes armoured 
vehicles to the US military. However, the formation of the Franco-German EADS company 
(European Aerospace, Defence and Space company) in 2000 brought the aerospace division 
of Dasa under EADS control and with it, Dasa experienced the disadvantages of a French 
connection in the political aftermath of the Iraq war and US antipathy towards French 
industry. 
         At the level of the defence industry itself, then, recent restructuring and consolidation 
have created a complex, interwoven cobweb of trans-national corporate ownership that is both 
hard to disentangle and effectively conceals where influence and market power may really lie.  
In reality, however, this ownership maze that lies on the surface of the industry is only part of 
the picture. Hidden beneath this evolving defence industry infrastructure lies an equally 
important level of ownership – that of the capital providers to the industry and it is this which 
we now turn to explore. 
 
CAPITAL PROVIDERS TO THE INDUSTRY  
                  An analysis was undertaken of the shareholder registers the 28 companies listed in 
Table 1 above to identify the major shareholders. It should be stressed that the shareholder 
register of a public listed company is constantly changing by its very nature.  Shares are 
traded daily on the stock market and large shifts in the overall profile of ownership can occur 
quite rapidly.  The figures discussed below should therefore be seen as a snapshot in time, as 
the day before and the day after would have been slightly different. The major shareholders 
do, however, tend to change much more slowly.  
          Estimating the approximate balance of ownership from the share registers, showed that 
only 11 (roughly 39%) of the 28 are wholly British owned or controlled (see Table 2).  Four 








Table 2: Major British Defence Contractors:                 

















Notes:    Roundings and estimations used for listed 
companies. 




         A well-known and striking feature of the 2002/3 list of contractors is the dominant 
position of the BAE Systems PLC group (BAES).  Two of the four contractors receiving 
more than £500 million from the MoD are part of the group, the group owns 37.5% of one of 
the seven contractors in the £250m-£500m band, owns two of the contractors in the £100m-
£250m band, and owns 50% of another.  By any standards this is a very powerful industrial 
presence.  What the official tables do not reveal is the ownership of BAES itself.   
         On 17
th June 2004 the largest five shareholders each had a small percentage of the 
shares in issue, totalling only 19.9% (see Table 3).  This is not a high degree of concentration 
for unconnected investors.  Three of them were American, and all of these were “passive” 
investment managers rather than industrial groups investing for reasons of corporate strategy. 
The largest of them, Brandes, managed $82.7 billion at March 31
st 2004 (Annual Report), an 
amount far in excess of the market capitalisation of BAES.  Precise numbers cannot be 
computed because access was not available to details of very small shareholdings, but of the 





Table 3: BAE  Systems PLC – Major Shareholders 
 
Brandes Investment Partners 
Barclays PLC 













Notes:  1.  The percentages are rounded to one decimal place 
2. The figures are minima, as it is possible that some small        
     shareholdings associated with the same shareholders have 
     not  been identified on the register. 
3.  Source: Bloomberg, 17
th June 2004 
 
  
         The overall profile that emerges for BAES is of an international and well-spread share 
register with no large strategic stakes.  This is consonant with the commercial position of the 
company as a global competitor in major defence markets.  In 2004 the main owners of it 
were American and British portfolio investors.  Their investments would take on a greater 
strategic significance if they became less “passive” and more “active” investors. 
         Four of the other major defence contractors were investigated: QinetiQ Limited, Rolls 
Royce PLC, Devonport Royal Dockyard, and Smiths Group PLC.  All of them, like BAES, 
have a strong American presence in their ownership.  QinetiQ is an interesting case, as the 
British Government, which is the majority shareholder, still technically controls it, but it has a 
major American shareholder, described in the Annual Report of the company as a “strategic 
partner”.  This is Carlyle Group, a private equity investment manager with a strong interest in 
the defence field, a company that could in no way be described as a passive investor.  The 
stated public aim of the management and shareholders of the company is to bring about a 
public flotation in the relatively near future.     It remains to be seen what proportion of the 















Notes:   The percentages are rounded to one decimal place. 
Source: “Western European Industry Ownership Jigsaw”, in    
             Defence Systems Daily, 2005. 
. 
 
         Rolls Royce is different again.  The British government is not a shareholder, and like 
BAES it is a public listed company, but it has a much more concentrated share register than 
BAES.  Again, American interests are very much in evidence (see Table 5).  The five largest 
shareholders were all non-UK, and together owned at least 38% of the shares.  It could be 




Table 5: Rolls Royce PLC – Major Shareholders 
 








  9.5% 
  5.3% 
  3.4% 
  3.0% 
 
Notes:   The percentages are rounded to one decimal place. 
Source: Bloomberg, 17
th June 2004 
. 
 
assets it manages rather than for its own principal interest, it is of no special strategic 
significance.  A stake as large as 17% might, however, be of great potential interest to an  
industrial group with defence interests, and Franklin could theoretically sell at any time.  Of 
the top 170 shareholders at least 99 are non-UK, with 49 of them American. 
                Devonport Royal Dockyard has a special Public/Private Partnerhsip (PPP) operating 
structure in which the dockyards themselves are still owned by the British Government but 
the business carried on within it is done by a private sector company, DML.  This is 
controlled by an American oil services giant, Halliburton, who have become a major 
contractor to the US Department of defence through their support operations in Iraq. There 
are also two large UK shareholders, albeit in a minority position (see Table 6). 
 
Table 6: Devonport Royal Dockyard – Major   
               Shareholders in DML (managers of yard) 
 
Halliburton Corporation 
Balfour Beatty PLC 




      24.5% 
24.5% 
 
Source: “Western European Industry Ownership Jigsaw”, 
in               
             Defence Systems Daily, 2005 
. 
 
        The largest single shareholder of Smiths Group PLC is also American, as are 50 of the 
top 170 shareholders (see Table 7).  This shareholder is Capital Group, which was also the 
fifth largest shareholder in BAES.  Two of the other five largest shareholders also had large 
shareholdings in other contractors to the British Ministry of Defence:  Franklin Templeton 
Group, which was also the largest shareholder in Rolls Royce PLC, and Legal and General, 
the British financial services group, which was also the third largest shareholder in BAES.  
Non-UK investors held at least 40% of the share capital and represented 105 of the top 170 
shareholders.    
 
 
Table 7: Smiths Group PLC – Major       
               Shareholders 
 
Capital Group 
 Franklin Templeton Group 
Legal and General PLC 
Cater Allen 




  7.0% 
  4.2% 
  3.3% 
  2.8% 
Notes:    The percentages are rounded to one decimal 
place. 
Source:   Bloomberg, 17
th June 2004 
. 
 
        All the investing companies mentioned as major shareholders in Smiths Group PLC 
were also found to have extensive interests in many other defence contractors.  This may 
mean nothing more than that the investment policy of these investors current at the time 
favoured the defence sector, or it may have a wider meaning that is not immediately apparent.  





        Major  changes  have  been  taking  place in the global defence industrial base as 
corporations and governments respond to the end of the cold war and the wider effects of 
business globalisation.  British defence contractors has shown the degree to which they have 
been positioning themselves for optimal strategic advantage in this new world.  They have 
acquired substantial defence-related productive assets in other countries and especially the 
USA.  This analysis of the ownership structure of British companies has shown the degree to 
which they in turn have developed international shareholder bases, with American investors 
figuring prominently.   
         The degree of foreign ownership and the involvement of individual shareholders across 
the different defence contractors was surprising. It would seem to represent a further stage in 
a financial and industrial integration of British, American, and to a lesser extent, continental 
European defence interests.  In the case of the UK and the USA it mirrors a close military co-
operation in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the “War on Terror”.  Governments, operating companies 
and investors (providers of capital) would seem to be involved in the creation of a new trans-
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